



Insight beyond the rating.

BCE Inc. Privatization

DBRS's Ratings on BCE Acquisition Inc. (BAI) and Bell Canada

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DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- Outline of Presentation – Paul Holman:
 - An Overview of Telecom/Cable/Media; Why BCE now?
 - DBRS's Leveraged Finance Initiatives
 - A Review of BCE's Privatization
 - Summary of Financing
 - Summary of New Structure
 - BAI/Bell Canada Issuer Ratings
 - BAI and Bell Canada Recovery and Instrument Ratings
 - Concluding Remarks
 - Questions and Answers
 - Appendix A
 - A Review of Major Milestones
 - DBRS's Rating Actions: Closely Followed Milestones

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- An Overview – Paul Holman:
 - DBRS's view of Industry Ratings
 - Telecom – "A" range
 - Wireless – BBB (high) to A (low) range
 - Cable – mid BBB range
 - Publishing & Media – mid BBB range
 - Evolution of telcos: The New Equilibrium
 - DBRS's Philosophy on Finalizing Ratings on Events
 - Overview of DBRS's philosophy
 - Why we moved on BAI/Bell Canada prior to closing

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- DBRS's Leveraged Finance Initiatives – Steven Bavaria:
 - DBRS's Leveraged Finance ratings capture both key elements of credit
 - Probability of default in timely payment ("Issuer Rating")
 - Likely recovery in the event of default ("Recovery Rating")
 - Blends both together in an "Instrument Rating" – which may be "notched" up or down – or not at all – from the Issuer Rating
 - Critical to leveraged finance investors, to whom deal-specific analysis (structure, covenants, post-default protection) is equally important as likelihood of default

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



DBRS Recovery Rating and Notching of Instrument Rating

Recovery Rating	Anticipated Recovery (%)	Recovery Description	Notching: Instrument Rating vs. Issuer Rating
1	90-100	Outstanding	3 notches
2	70-90	Substantial	2 notches
3	50-70	Good	1 notch
4	30-50	Average	0 notch
5	10-30	Below Average	-1 notch
6	0-10	Poor	-2 notches

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- A Review of BCE's Privatization – Chris Diceman:
 - Rampant market rumours H1 2007
 - Agreed to privatization June 30, 2007 \$42.75 per share:
 - ~\$35 billion equity value, ~\$52 billion enterprise value
 - Equity sponsors include:
 - Teachers Private Capital (investment arm of OTPPB)
 - Providence Equity Partners Inc.
 - Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC
 - Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity, Inc.
 - Other equity investors: TD Bank and Other
 - Banks include: Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, RBS, TD Bank
 - Expected close: on or before December 11, 2008
 - Major Milestones and DBRS's Actions - see Appendix A

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- Summary of Financing:
 - \$35 billion of current equity to be funded 22% with new equity & 78% with new debt
 - Equity of ~\$7.75 billion
 - New BAI debt ~\$32 billion
 - \$21.0 billion secured bank debt;
 - \$11.3 billion unsecured notes
 - Redemption of BCE/Bell debt and BCE preferred shares upon close:
 - \$1.95 billion of BCE/Bell debt;
 - \$2.78 billion BCE preferred shares
 - Remaining Bell Canada debt ~\$6.5 billion

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



Sources:

Equity Commitment	7,750.0
Cash on Hand	826.0
New BAI Debt	32,350.0
A/R Securitization	-

Existing Bell Canada Debt	6,571.0
Capital Leases	1,215.0

Total Sources 48,712.0

Uses:

Purchase of Equity	(34,662.0)
Redemption of BCE Pref. Shares	(2,770.0)
Redemption of BCE/Bell Debt	(1,950.0)
Reduction of A/R Securitization	(1,044.0)
Cash Balance/Other	(1,800.0)

Existing Bell Canada Debt	(5,271.0)
Capital Leases	(1,215.0)

Total Uses (48,712.0)

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada




- Summary of Financing:
 - New equity of ~\$7.75 billion; allocation as follows:

<u>Equity Commitment:</u>		<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of total</u>
Teachers Private Capital	PI - Cdn.	4,000.0	51.6%
Providence Equity Partners Inc.	PI	1,658.5	21.4%
Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC	PI	700.0	9.0%
Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity	PI	475.0	6.1%
Toronto Dominion Bank	AEI - Cdn.	450.0	5.8%
Other	AEI	416.5	5.4%
Other	AEI - Cdn.	50.0	0.6%
Total Equity Commitment		7,750.0	100.0%

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- Summary of New Structure:



DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- Summary of New Structure – Andrew Fitzpatrick:
 - Structure created with intention to maintain covenants under Bell's indentures (1976 indenture)
 - Bell Canada senior debentures \$4.9 billion, will gain security against Bell Canada's wireline assets
 - Pari Passu/Permitted Lien provision - 1976 indenture;
 - Negative pledge/Permitted Lien provision – 1997 indenture

Bell Canada		
<u>Consolidated (ex. Bell Aliant)</u>	<u>June 30/08</u>	<u>Pro Forma</u>
Bell Canada Senior Debentures (to be secured)	\$6,194M	\$4,894M
Bell Canada Subordinated Debentures	\$275M	\$275M
Other debt (capital leases, etc.)	<u>\$1,315M</u>	<u>\$1,390M</u>
Total Bell Canada Debt (cons. ex Bell Aliant)	\$7,786M	\$6,559M

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- Summary of New Structure – Andrew Fitzpatrick:
 - BAI's ~\$32 billion of debt to include:
 - \$21.0 billion of secured bank debt; and
 - \$11.3 billion of senior/subordinate unsecured notes
 - BAI's debt: guarantees from Bell Canada (senior and subordinate), Bell Mobility, Bell ExpressVu, BCE
 - BAI's \$21 billion secured debt to be secured by:
 - Bell Mobility, Bell ExpressVu and Bell Canada

BCE Acquisition Inc.

<u>BCE Acquisition Inc. (BAI)</u>	<u>June 30/08</u>	<u>Pro Forma</u>
Total BAI Secured Debt	--	\$21,050M
Total BAI Unsecured Notes	\$0M	\$11,300M
Total BAI/BCE Inc. Debt (Unconsolidated)	\$650M	\$32,350M
Consolidated Debt (BAI/BCE & Bell)	\$8,436M	\$38,909M

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- BAI/Bell Canada Issuer Ratings – Chris Diceman:
 - Consolidated BAI/Bell Canada:
 - Two Issuer Ratings of BB (low) at BAI and Bell Canada; reflect same probability of default
 - Tied together with guarantees and security;
 - Cross default, cross acceleration;
 - Management commonality
 - Business risk unchanged;
 - Financial risk increased significantly

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- BAI/Bell Canada Issuer Ratings:
 - Business Risk Profile of BAI/Bell:
 - Unchanged with privatization
 - Strong wireline, wireless and video businesses
 - Healthy cash flow from operations generator:
 - ~40% EBITDA margins;
 - Capex intensity ~mid-teens as % of revenue
 - Management to seek operating synergies, improve competitiveness, change the culture, etc.
 - Financial Risk Profile:
 - Increased from 2.0 times gross debt to EBITDA to 6.5 times
 - To remain free cash flow positive: elimination of dividends, cash tax savings to help offset higher interest expense
 - Maturity schedule reasonable; sufficient liquidity

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- BAI/Bell Canada Issuer Ratings – Jamie Wetmore:
 - BAI/Bell Canada Issuer Ratings at BB (low) fit well versus other Leveraged Finance credits including:
 - BB (low): ALLTEL; Cablevision; Rainbow Media
 - B (high): Mediacom
 - B: Clear Channel
 - B (low): Nortel, Level 3, Tribune
 - Also DBRS confirmed our ratings on Bell Aliant at:
 - R-1 (low), BBB (high) and STA-2 (high)
 - BCE's privatization does not directly impact Bell Aliant
 - Nothing precluding BCE's new owners from future initiatives

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- BAI/Bell Canada Recovery and Instrument Ratings – Chris Diceman:
 - Ratings assigned reflect two key elements of credit:
 - Risk of Default;
 - Expected Recovery
 - Default Scenario:
 - Modeled a three-year period which simulates a situation of a potential default
 - Recovery Analysis:
 - Valued three components of BAI upon default with conservative EBITDA multiples;
 - Aggregate Enterprise Value ranges 47%, 33% and 19% below value of privatization (worst, base, best cases)

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- BAI/Bell Canada Recovery and Instrument Ratings:
 - Bell Canada Secured Debt (\$4.9 billion): RR1/BBB (low)
 - Outstanding recovery prospects: (90%-100%)
 - RR1 + BB (low) Bell IR = BBB (low) Instrument Rating
 - Rating is three notches above Bell Canada's Issuer Rating

DBRS Recovery Rating and Notching of Instrument Rating

Recovery Rating	Anticipated Recovery (%)	Recovery Description	Notching: Instrument Rating vs. Issuer Rating
1	90-100	Outstanding	3 notches
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4	30-50	Average	0 notch
5	10-30	Below Average	-1 notch
6	0-10	Poor	-2 notches

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- BAI/Bell Canada Recovery and Instrument Ratings:
 - BAI Secured Credit Facility (\$23 billion): RR1/BBB (low)
 - Outstanding recovery prospects: (90%-100%)
 - RR1 + BB (low) BAI IR = BBB (low) Instrument Rating
 - Rating is three notches above BAI's Issuer Rating
 - BAI Senior Unsecured Notes (\$7.5 billion): RR3/BB
 - Good recovery prospects: (50%-70%)
 - RR3 + BB (low) BAI IR = BB Instrument Rating
 - Rating is one notch above BAI's Issuer Rating

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- BAI/Bell Canada Recovery and Instrument Ratings:
 - BAI Subordinated Unsecured Notes (\$3.8 billion): RR6/B
 - Poor recovery prospects: (0%-10%)
 - RR6 + BB (low) BAI IR = B Instrument Rating
 - Rating is two notches below BAI's Issuer Rating
 - Bell Canada Subordinated Debt (\$275 million): RR6/B
 - Poor recovery prospects: (0%-10%)
 - RR6 + BB (low) Bell Canada IR = B Instrument Rating
 - Rating is two notches below Bell Canada's Issuer Rating
 - Debt ranked beneath BAI subordinated notes

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- Concluding Remarks – Paul Holman & Steve Bavaria:
 - Outlook for BAI/Bell Canada going forward
 - How BAI/Bell Canada fits with other Communications & Media Leveraged Finance credits
- DBRS's Leveraged Finance Methodology going forward
 - The current flight from risk in the leveraged markets
 - Indiscriminate widening across the board
 - “Throw the baby out with the bath water”
 - Mirror image of the pre-crash environment, when any credit flew off the shelves
 - Will cause a return to greater differentiation between credits
 - Greater focus on individual credit risk
 - More focus on credit ratings and analytical write-ups

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- Questions and Answers:
 - Paul Holman
 - Managing Director – Communications & Media
 - Chris Diceman, CFA
 - Senior Vice President – Communications & Media
 - Jamie Wetmore
 - Assistant Vice President – Communications & Media
 - Andrew Fitzpatrick
 - Vice President – Canadian Structured Finance
 - Steven Bavaria
 - Managing Director – Leveraged Finance

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- For More information:
 - Visit: www.dbrs.com
 - Email us at: info@dbrs.com

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- Appendix A:
 - A Review of Major Milestones
 - DBRS's Rating Actions

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- A Review of the Major Milestones:
 - January–April 2007: Rampant Market Rumours
 - April 9, 2007: OTPPB Files 13D: BCE stake changed from a passive holding to an active holding
 - April 17, 2007: BCE Reviewing Strategic Alternatives
 - June 30, 2007: Acquisition Agreement Reached - \$42.75
 - Sept. 21, 2007: BCE Shareholder Vote
 - Sept. 21, 2007 – June 23, 2008: All Canadian and U.S. regulatory approvals achieved
 - June 20, 2008: Supreme Court Reinstates Approval Order
 - July 4, 2008: Purchase, Financing Agreements Finalized
 - On or before Dec. 11, 2008: Close of privatization

DBRS's Ratings on BAI/Bell Canada



- DBRS's Rating Actions: Closely Followed Milestones:
 - April 12, 2007: Commented on Market Speculation
 - April 17, 2007: BCE/Bell Placed UR, Negative
 - June 21, 2007: Hosted Teleconference on BCE/TELUS
 - July 3, 2007: Maintained BCE/Bell UR, Negative
 - July 6, 2007: Commented on impact on Bell Aliant
 - Sept. 25, 2007: Hosted Teleconference
 - Nov. 27, 2007: Maintained BCE/Bell UR, Negative
 - June 20, 2008: Notes BCE/Bell Remain UR, Negative
 - Oct. 7, 2008: New Ratings Assigned, Existing Ratings Downgraded
 - On or before Dec. 11, 2008: Discontinue BCE debt and preferred ratings upon redemption